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Icc to determIne JurIsdIctIon 
over lIbyan offIcIals and set 
Precedent on court’s scoPe
Libya has challenged the admissibility 
of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) 
case against Saif al-Islam Qaddafi and 
Abdullah al-Senussi on charges of crimes 
against humanity on the grounds that the 
State is capable of conducting a fair trial 
according to its domestic law and is in the 
process of building a case against both men. 
The May 2012 motion submitted on behalf 
of the government of Libya requested an 
oral hearing on the admissibility chal-
lenge pursuant to Article 19 of the Rome 
Statute by arguing that the case against 
the former officials in the government 
of Muammar Qaddafi should be deemed 
inadmissible because domestic investiga-
tions and prosecutions are underway in 
Libya. The expected ruling by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber on admissibility in this case could 
set important precedents on both admis-
sibility and the scope of ICC jurisdiction. 
If the Court allows Libya to carry out the 
trials of both defendants domestically, the 
result would strengthen the ability of States 
to challenge admissibility and make it more 
difficult for the ICC to bring international 
criminals to justice.
Under Article 5 of the Rome Statute, 
the ICC has jurisdiction over serious 
crimes that concern the international com-
munity as a whole, including genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 
Prosecutors charged both Saif al-Islam 
Qaddafi and al-Senussi with two counts 
of crimes against humanity in connection 
with the murder and persecution of Libyan 
civilians during the 2011 popular upris-
ing. However, the Court may only exercise 
this jurisdiction in accordance with the 
principle of complementarity. The prin-
ciple, as stated in the Preamble and in 
Article 1 of the Rome Statute, declares that 
ICC jurisdiction exists alongside national 
criminal jurisdictions and must defer to 
ongoing national prosecutions and inves-
tigations. Article 19 allows a State to 
challenge admissibility if that State is 
actively investigating and prosecuting the 
defendant for the crimes alleged by the 
Prosecutor of the ICC.
Libya’s challenge invoked both its 
right to dispute the admissibility of the 
case under Article 19(2)(b) and the prin-
ciple of complementarity under Article 1. 
Libya has held Qaddafi in custody since 
November 2011, and Mauritania recently 
extradited al-Senussi to Libya after captur-
ing him in March 2012. Libyan officials 
have stated repeatedly that the two men 
will be tried in Libya under Libyan law 
with the possibility of facing the death 
penalty if convicted.
In response to Libya’s challenge, the 
ICC Office of the Prosecution noted that 
under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, 
admissibility-challenge determinations 
are made using a two-step process. First, 
national investigation and prosecution must 
be ongoing. Second, those proceedings 
must be “genuine.” The challenging State 
must demonstrate that the proceedings are 
“genuine” within the meaning of Article 
17(1)(a) by showing that the proceedings 
are not merely a pretense designed to 
shield the accused or guarantee impunity, 
and under Article 19 that the State is able 
to advance the proceedings in accordance 
with Article 17(3). Under Article 17(3) 
the Court will examine whether there has 
been a substantial collapse of the judicial 
system and if the State is unable to conduct 
investigations and trials. The prosecution 
ultimately agreed that Libya has taken gen-
uine steps toward investigating the charges 
against Qaddafi and al-Senussi but also 
expressed concern about Libya’s ability to 
advance the case in domestic courts. The 
prosecution thus requested more infor-
mation from Libya about its ability to 
advance the case domestically. The Pre-
Trial Chamber responded in October 2012 
and requested public hearings in order to 
make a final decision on Libya’s ability to 
advance domestic prosecution.
The concepts of admissibility and 
complementarity in international criminal 
law remain debated among human rights 
scholars and advocates. Many argue that 
the ICC should be regarded as only a court 
of last resort; Libya should be allowed to 
conduct a domestic prosecution. Others 
claim Libya’s justice system is not cur-
rently capable of carrying out a free and 
fair trial, so a domestic trial would result in 
further human rights violations and a delay 
in justice for the civilian victims of the 
Libyan uprising. The ICC’s questionable 
jurisdiction over Qaddafi and al-Senussi 
highlights one of the biggest challenges 
the ICC has faced in its few years of exis-
tence: the difficult task of balancing state 
sovereignty with accountability for human 
rights abuses. If Libya submits both men to 
the ICC, it would be a symbolic milestone 
for the Court’s authority and would bolster 
or perhaps legitimize that authority in the 
eyes of the international community.
fIrst Person convIcted by Icc 
aPPeals convIctIon and sentence
In an historic moment for the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), 
Thomas Lubanga became the first person 
convicted by the Court. Lubanga was found 
guilty of enlisting and conscripting child 
soldiers in an armed conflict on the side 
of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
sentenced to fourteen years’ imprisonment. 
While both the defense and the prosecu-
tion are appealing the sentence, the ICC’s 
verdict and sentencing in Lubanga’s case 
is a landmark that monumentally bolsters 
the accountability of the court. However, a 
fight over the conviction and the sentenc-
ing procedure could have serious conse-
quences for not only the other Congolese 
nationals currently still on trial at the ICC 
but also for all future cases brought against 
alleged perpetrators of war crimes.
Following Lubanga’s March 14, 2012, 
conviction, at the request of the defense 
and pursuant to the Rome Statute Article 
76(2), the Trial Chamber held a separate 
sentencing hearing. On July 10, 2012, at 
the conclusion of the hearing, the ICC 
Trial Chamber I sentenced Lubanga. The 
time from Lubanga’s arrest on March 16, 
2006, until the date of his sentencing was 
deducted from his sentence, resulting in 
less than eight years’ further imprisonment 
for his crimes. Lawyers on both sides of 
the judgment are not satisfied with the 
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Chamber’s decision. On October 3, 2012, 
Lubanga’s lawyers filed both a notice 
to appeal the guilty verdict and a notice 
of intent to have his sentence canceled 
or reduced. On the same day, the pros-
ecution likewise informed the Chamber of 
its intent to appeal the sentence seeking 
a harsher punishment.
In the Chamber’s sentencing decision 
analysis, it looked to the applicable arti-
cles of the Rome Statute as well as the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence for guid-
ance. Specifically, Article 76(1) of the 
Statute states that the Trial Chamber shall 
decide the appropriate sentence, taking 
into account “the evidence presented and 
[the] submissions made during the trial 
that are relevant to the sentence.” Article 
77(1) allows for sentencing up to a maxi-
mum of thirty years except in cases when 
a term of life imprisonment is “justified 
by the extreme gravity of the crime and 
the individual circumstances of the con-
victed person.” Most importantly, Article 
78 together with Rule 145 gives guide-
lines for determining sentences. Article 
78(1) says the sentence must take into 
account “the gravity of the crime and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted 
person.” Rule 145(1)(a) and (b) state that 
the sentence must reflect the culpability 
of the convicted person and the Chamber 
needs to balance all of the relevant factors, 
including aggravating factors and mitigating 
circumstances.
In applying these guidelines, the Trial 
Chamber identified six relevant factors 
that it took into account in determining 
Lubanga’s sentence: the gravity of the 
crime and resulting damage, the large-
scale and widespread nature of the crimes, 
the degree of participation and intent 
of the convicted person, the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person, 
aggravating circumstances, and mitigating 
circumstances. The Trial Chamber found 
that while the involvement of children 
was widespread, the Chamber could not 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a precise number or proportion of the 
recruits were under the age of fifteen. The 
Trial Chamber found that as President 
and Commander-in-Chief of the UPC, 
Lubanga encouraged children to enlist 
and even personally employed bodyguards 
under the age of fifteen. Additionally, the 
Trial Chamber determined that Lubanga, 
an intelligent and well-educated person, 
understood the seriousness of the crimes 
committed. The Trial Chamber consid-
ered several claims of aggravating circum-
stances presented by the prosecution, includ-
ing punishment of the children while under 
Lubanga’s control, alleged sexual violence 
against the child soldiers, and commission 
of the crime when the victims were particu-
larly defenseless, but each was dismissed. 
Finally, although the Trial Chamber accepted 
Lubanga’s cooperation with the Court as a 
mitigating factor, the Chamber dismissed the 
defense’s argument that Lubanga’s actions 
during the conflict were necessary to achieve 
demobilization and peace.
Article 81 of the Rome Statute stipu-
lates the grounds for appeal of a convic-
tion or sentence. Lubanga may appeal his 
conviction on the grounds of procedural 
error, error of fact, error of law, or on a 
ground of unfairness or unreliability of 
the proceedings or decision. According 
to Article 81(2), however, either side may 
appeal a sentence if it is disproportion-
ate to the crime. A reversal of Lubanga’s 
landmark conviction or a reduction of his 
sentence would likely raise human rights 
concerns about the ICC’s ability to achieve 
accountability for victims and to eliminate 
impunity. However, an increase in his 
sentence may also raise concerns of overly 
harsh punishments, especially in setting 
precedent for future sentencing, includ-
ing those for convictions for genocide and 
crimes against humanity.
Tracy French, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 




karadzIc’s rIght to a faIr trIal: 
ProtectIng the accused In the Icty
The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Trial 
Chamber rejected Radovan Karadzic’s 
motion for retrial on August 13, 2012. The 
former Serbian leader, accused of involve-
ment in the Srebrenica massacre, based 
his motion on the prosecution’s repeated 
failure to submit evidence in a timely 
fashion. The ICTY held that while the 
prosecution submitted evidence in viola-
tion of the rules of procedure, the delay did 
not prejudice the defense’s case or deny the 
defendant his right to fair trial.
The wartime leader of the Serb-
controlled area of Bosnia, known as 
Republika Srpska, has been on trial since 
2009 for charges of genocide, persecu-
tion, extermination, murder, and forced 
relocation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats, 
crimes committed between 1992 and 1996. 
Karadzic, who is representing himself, 
pled not guilty to all charges against him. 
The Chamber maintains that, although the 
prosecution has repeatedly failed to pro-
duce evidence on time, the judges ensured 
that the defense had ample time to review 
evidence and prepare responses.
The case’s central allegation is that 
Karadzic was involved in planning both the 
1995 Srebrenica massacre—resulting in the 
death of 8,000 Muslim men and boys—and 
the forty four-month siege of Sarajevo—
resulting in 12,000 deaths. After the United 
Nations Security Council instituted the 
ICTY, Karadzic remained at large for thir-
teen years before his July 2008 arrest.
Karadzic’s motion for a retrial accused 
the prosecution of failing to disclose 406 
witness statements and other testimonies 
in a timely fashion in addition to commit-
ting “numerous” violations of the rules of 
disclosure. Since the trial began in 2009, 
Karadzic has filed more than seventy 
motions alleging various late or improper 
disclosures of evidence. In several of such 
instances, the ICTY Trial Chamber stopped 
trial proceedings and provided Karadzic 
with sufficient time to review documents 
or other late evidence. Despite the pros-
ecutors’ repeated infractions of the ICTY’s 
rules of procedure, the Trial Chamber’s 
Judge Kwon, in the August decision, ruled 
that while the actions “put the prosecution 
in a bad light,” Karadzic had not “suffered 
damage from this violation,” and thus it 
was not necessary to grant him a new trial.
As the ICTY has not established a 
standard to determine fairness of a trial, 
the Chamber looked to general protections 
of the rights of the accused as outlined in 
the Statute of the Tribunal. Articles 20(1), 
21(4)(c) and 21(4)(b) protect the accused’s 
right to be tried expeditiously, without 
undue delay, with full respect of his or her 
rights (as enumerated in other international 
treaties, such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights), and to have 
“adequate time and facilities for the prepa-
ration of his defense.” The Chamber also 
considered its own procedural rulings in 
each of Karadzic’s previous complaints 
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about the Prosecutor’s failure to disclose. 
The Chamber explained its decision by 
applying the general articles delineated in 
the Statute and looking at the cumulative 
effect of the repeated delays of disclosure. 
Judge Kwon’s decision stated that the nature 
of the evidence was neither sufficiently dif-
ferent from other evidence nor substantial 
enough to prejudice Karadzic’s case.
In reaching its decision, the Chamber’s 
central question was how the defendant’s 
procedural rights relate to whether the 
defendant has received a fair trial. The 
ICTY has often faced such questions and 
has applied Judge Shahabuddeen’s state-
ment in his Separate Opinion on Slobodan 
Milošević that “the fairness of a trial need 
not require perfection in every detail. The 
essential question is whether the accused 
has had a fair chance of dealing with 
the allegations against him.” In light of 
the prosecution’s repeated missteps, the 
question of whether Karadzic receives a 
sufficiently “fair chance” of addressing 
the charges against him broadens because 
of his refusal to accept the advice of 
legal counsel. Although the Chamber has 
undertaken “active management” of the 
trial to protect Karadzic’s rights when 
the prosecution has violated the rules of 
disclosure, the court is unable to force 
Karadzic to listen to or take the advice of 
his court-appointed standby legal adviser. 
As the trial moves forward, the Chamber 
must continue to balance the often-com-
peting interests in protecting the rights of 
the accused, helping Karadzic navigate 
his defense without legal representation, 
and ensuring that the prosecution does not 
infringe on Karadzic’s right to a fair trial.
InternatIonal crImInal trIbunal 
for cybercrIme and human rIghts
As communication and commerce shift 
into the cyberworld, some states have 
questioned criminal law’s ability to pro-
tect commercial and public interests. 
In his “Recommendations for Potential 
New Global Legal Mechanisms Against 
Global Cyberattacks and Other Global 
Cybercrimes,” Norwegian Judge Stein 
Schjolberg, Chairman of the global High-
Level Experts Group on Cybersecurity, 
called for increased enforcement mecha-
nisms, writing that “without an interna-
tional court or tribunal for dealing with 
the most serious cybercrimes of global 
concern, many serious cyberattacks will 
go unpunished.” Schjolberg argued that 
the 2001 Council of Europe Convention 
on Cybercrime (Cybercrime Convention), 
although open internationally for rat-
ification, is insufficient to address all 
global cybercrimes. The crimes of con-
cern to Schjolberg in his draft Statute 
for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Cyberspace (ICTC) include attacks 
on communication infrastructure, ille-
gal access, forgery, identity theft, and 
fraud—all of which reflect the Cybercrime 
Convention’s structure and delineated 
crimes. For Schjolberg, however, the 
Cybercrime Convention falls short because 
it lacks an authoritative body capable of 
enforcing the laws in the realm of inter-
national criminal law. For non-European 
countries, the Cybercrime Convention 
does not address Internet-based crimes 
that are common among developing and 
transitional nations.
In the absence of an international tri-
bunal, states have addressed cybercrime 
through domestic legislation. Recently, 
the Philippines’s legislature passed a 
law reflecting acts criminalized in the 
Cybercrime Convention; however, the 
legislation included an additional crime 
that, according to that nation’s Supreme 
Court, violates citizens’ human rights. The 
Filipino law expanded the definition of 
criminal libel to include statements made 
on the Internet and increased the penalty 
for criminal libel to six years’ imprison-
ment. In 2011, the United Nations’ Human 
Rights Committee declared that impris-
onment of Filipino journalists for libel 
violated Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). In keeping with this ruling, the 
Filipino Supreme Court determined that 
the new law violates the human rights to 
freedom of expression and opinion.
Like the Cybercrime Convention, Judge 
Schjolberg’s recommendation garnered 
criticism for being too Euro-centric and 
ignoring the unique threats and concerns 
that developing nations face. Although the 
Cybercrime Convention is open for ratifi-
cation globally, the treaty is only widely 
accepted within Europe, and the only non-
Member State parties are the United States 
and Japan. When Brazil considered sign-
ing the Convention, it eventually decided 
not to because the intellectual property-
crime provisions were not compatible with 
Brazil’s developing and emerging mar-
ket. Such emerging markets, which also 
include China, Russia, India, and Turkey, 
are often the most vulnerable and at the 
highest risk for cyberthreats.
The draft ICTC statute claims to out-
line the most serious crimes that would 
trigger the tribunal’s jurisdiction over indi-
viduals, but it does not include any Internet 
crimes that implicate human rights, and it 
leaves conspicuously absent any mention 
of freedom of speech. Judge Schjolberg 
recommended including the ICTC as a 
specialized bench within the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), a body established 
to address, as stated in the Rome Statute 
establishing the Court, the “most serious 
crimes of concern to the international 
community,” including genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. It is 
unclear how the defined cybercrimes meet 
the ICC’s jurisdiction, which generally 
covers the gravest breaches of human 
rights. The proposed tribunal also does not 
address the prominent cybercrime discus-
sion occurring among international bodies, 
states, and non-governmental organiza-
tions, a discussion that focuses on limita-
tions to speech online, the vulnerability 
of individuals’ human rights to freedom 
of expression, and speech included within 
cybercrime legislation. Furthermore, creat-
ing an international court tasked with pros-
ecuting individuals accused of committing 
cybercrimes, particularly without address-
ing the human rights implications of such 
crimes and the legislation countries pass 
to prevent them, increases vulnerability of 
individuals to domestic criminal laws that 
include additional provisions that restrict 
human rights.
A 2012 Freedom House study on 
Internet freedoms and human rights found 
that twenty of the forty seven studied 
countries experienced a loss in Internet 
freedom since January 2011. In June 2012, 
the UN Human Rights Council passed a 
resolution affirming Internet freedom as 
a human right. By proposing a tribunal 
that addresses only economic or privacy-
based crimes on the Internet, Schjolberg 
ignores one of the most prominent con-
cerns regarding Internet safety and opens 
the door to repressive state governments 
to adopt laws in compliance with the 
proposed tribunal that may easily include 
clauses and provisions that overstep citi-
zens’ rights to Internet access, freedom of 
expression, and access to information.
Critics argue that the only way to estab-
lish a global governing document or body 
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to regulate cybercrime is to allow input and 
ownership of nations from throughout the 
world. It may be wasteful to throw away the 
successes of the Cybercrime Convention 
and Judge Schjolberg’s Recommendations, 
but redrafting and amending the treaty to 
include representatives from developing 
and developed nations alike would add 
legitimacy to the process.
Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Judgment summarIes: 
InternatIonal crImInal trIbunal 
for rwanda
théoneste bagosora and anatole 
nsengIyumva v. the Prosecutor, 
case no. Ictr-98-41-a
On December 14, 2011, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its 
judgment in the case against Théoneste 
Bagosora and Anatole Nsengiyumva, 
two of the four defendants tried in the 
Bagosora et. al. case, affirming some 
but not all charges. Both before and 
during the 1994 conflict, the men held 
high-ranking positions in the Rwandan 
Government: Nsengiyumva served as the 
Commander of the Gisenyi Operational 
Sector and Bagosora served as Directeur 
de Cabinet for the Ministry of Defense. 
Both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals 
Chamber found that Bagosora held 
effective control over the Rwandan 
Armed Forces from April 6–9, 1994, 
because the President was killed and 
the Minister of Defense was out of the 
country. The Prosecution alleged that 
both Nsengiyumva and Bagosora were 
responsible for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes, either through 
directly ordering the attacks, or pursuant 
to the doctrine of superior responsibility.
In its judgment of December 18, 
2008, Trial Chamber I found Bagosora 
guilty of genocide, six counts of crimes 
against humanity (comprising extermi-
nation, rape, persecution, two counts of 
murder, and other inhumane acts), and 
three counts of war crimes (two counts of 
violence to life and one count of outrages 
upon personal dignity). Specifically, the 
Trial Chamber held Bagosora respon-
sible for ordering the murder of Augustin 
Maharangari, as well as for ordering 
killings, rapes, and other crimes commit-
ted from April 6-9, 1994, at Kigali road-
blocks. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber 
found Bagosora guilty of superior liabil-
ity for additional crimes, including the 
killings of the Prime Minister, the killings 
of civilians, rapes at a Kigali roadblock, 
the sexual assault of the Prime Minister, 
the torture of Alphonse Kabiligi, and 
the sheparding of refugees to Gikondo 
Parish, where the refugees were killed.
The Trial Chamber found co-defen-
dant Nsengiyumva guilty of genocide, 
four counts of crimes against human-
ity (murder, extermination, persecution 
and inhumane acts), and one war crime 
(violence to life). Specifically, the Trial 
Chamber found Nsengiyumva guilty of 
ordering and guilty as a superior for the 
killings of individuals, as well as order-
ing the murder of Alphonse Kabiligi. The 
Trial Chamber also found Nsengiyumva 
aided and abetted the killings in the 
Bisesero area of Kibuye prefecture by 
sending militiamen to participate.
On appeal, Bagosora raised six chal-
lenges to his conviction and sentence. 
Bagosora alleged errors with regard to 
the Trial Chamber’s finding that he exer-
cised effective control over subordinates, 
fair trial violations with regard to the 
enforcement of a subpoena, errors in the 
assessment of the evidence, errors of law 
regarding the theory of superior respon-
sibility, and specific errors regarding 
his conviction for the sexual assault of 
Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana and his 
role in crimes committed at roadblocks 
in Kigali, as well as errors related to 
cumulative convictions and sentencing. 
Co-defendant Nsengiyumva raised fif-
teen challenges to his conviction and sen-
tence. He alleged that the Trial Judgment 
was void due to the resignation of Judge 
Reddy before the release of the writ-
ten judgment and raised several grounds 
relating to the fairness of the proceed-
ings, including the right to an initial 
appearance without delay, the right to 
be tried without undue delay, the right to 
be present at trial, the fact that the Trial 
Judgment did not admit some of the evi-
dence he submitted, and errors relating to 
disclosure. He also alleged errors regard-
ing insufficiencies in the indictment and 
the burden of proof upon the prosecution; 
insufficiency of the proof against him; 
errors with regard to the assessment of 
the evidence, including the credibility 
of several witnesses; inaccurate charac-
terization of the mode of responsibility; 
errors regarding how the Trial Chamber 
defined the elements of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes, and 
errors relating to cumulative convictions 
and sentencing.
The Appeals Chamber affirmed 
Bagosora’s convictions for genocide, 
extermination and persecution as crimes 
against humanity, and violence to life 
as a war crime in relation to killings 
at Kibagabaga Mosque, Kabeza, the 
Saint Josephite Centre, Karama Hill, 
Kibagabaga Catholic Church, Gikondo 
Parish, and Kigali-area roadblocks; 
extermination and persecution as 
crimes against humanity; and violence 
to life as a war crime in relation to 
the killings of Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana, Joseph Kavaruganda, 
Frédéric Nzamurambaho, Landoald 
Ndasingwa, and Faustin Rucogoza, as 
well as the killings at Centre Christus; 
murder as a crime against humanity 
and violence to life as a war crime in 
relation to the killings of the Belgian 
peacekeepers who were still alive when 
Bagosora visited Camp Kigali; rape as 
a crime against humanity in relation to 
the rapes committed at Kigali area road-
blocks, the Saint Josephite Centre, and 
Gikondo Parish; other inhumane acts as 
crimes against humanity in relation to the 
stripping of female refugees at the Saint 
Josephite Centre and the “sheparding” 
of refugees to Gikondo Parish, where 
they were killed; outrages upon personal 
dignity as a war crime in relation to the 
rapes at Kigali area roadblocks, the Saint 
Josephite Centre, and Gikondo Parish; 
and murder as a crime against humanity.
Notably, however, the Appeals 
Chamber reversed Bagosora’s convic-
tions for several charges including, his 
convictions for crimes against humanity 
and serious violations of Article 3 com-
mon to the Geneva Conventions and 
of Additional Protocol II (war crimes) 
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in relation to the killings of Alphonse 
Kabiligi, Augustin Maharangari, and the 
Belgian peacekeepers murdered before 
his visit to Camp Kigali, as well as his 
convictions for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes in relation to 
the killings at Nyundo Parish on April 
7-9, 1994. The Appeals Chamber also 
reversed his convictions for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
in relation to the killings in Gisenyi 
town on April 7, 1994, and at Mudende 
University on April 8, 1994, and his 
conviction for other inhumane acts 
as a crime against humanity in rela-
tion to the defilement of the corpse of 
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber set 
aside his conviction under individual 
criminal responsibility for ordering 
the crimes committed at Kigali road-
blocks while affirming his conviction 
under superior responsibility for those 
same offenses. Acting proprio motu, the 
Appeals Chamber reversed Bagosora’s 
conviction for murder as a crime against 
humanity—reasoning it was impermis-
sibly cumulative given his conviction for 
extermination as a crime against human-
ity—and set aside his sentence of life 
in prison, replacing it with a sentence of 
thirty-five years’ imprisonment.
In the case of Nsengiyumva, the 
Appeals Chamber affirmed his convic-
tions for genocide, extermination and 
persecution as crimes against humanity, 
and violence to life as a war crime for 
the killings in Gisenyi town on April 7, 
1994. However, the Chamber reversed his 
convictions for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes for aiding and 
abetting the crimes at Bisesero in the 
second half of June 1994, his convictions 
for genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes in relation to the killings 
at Mudende University on April 8, 1994, 
and at Nyundo Parish April 7–9, 1994, as 
well as his convictions for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes in relation to 
the killing of Alphonse Kabiligi. While 
the Appeals Chamber reversed his con-
victions for the April 7, 1994, killings in 
Gisenyi Town under individual criminal 
liability, finding he did not order these 
crimes, the Appeals Chamber affirmed 
his conviction for these killings (charged 
as genocide, the crimes against humanity 
of persecution and extermination, and the 
war crime of violence to life) under supe-
rior responsibility. Nsengiyumva’s sen-
tence was shortened from life in prison 
to fifteen years.
The Appeals Chamber focused much 
attention on the discussion of whether, 
despite the fact that the defendants 
could not be found guilty of ordering the 
crimes, the defendants could be found 
guilty pursuant to the superior responsi-
bility mode of liability under Article 6(3) 
of the ICTR Statute as a result of their 
positions of authority in the military. The 
Appeals Chamber held that due to the 
defendants’ positions within the military, 
they had a duty to prevent or punish sol-
diers or others under their control from 
engaging in illegal acts. The Appeals 
Chamber stated that “the duty to prevent 
arises for a superior from the moment 
he knows or has reason to know that his 
subordinate is about to commit a crime, 
while the duty to punish arises after the 
commission of the crime.” Additionally, 
the duty to prevent requires sufficient 
knowledge that the crimes will occur.
In analyzing whether Bagosora had 
sufficient knowledge that the crimes in 
Kigali would be committed, the Appeals 
Chamber looked at the “organized mil-
itary nature of the attacks, his posi-
tion of authority, the circumstances in 
which the crimes took place, and the fact 
that they occurred in Kigali where he 
was based.” From this information, the 
Appeals Chamber concluded the Trial 
Chamber was correct in finding that 
“the only reasonable inference available 
from the evidence was that [Bagosora] 
had actual knowledge that his subordi-
nates were about to commit the crimes” 
throughout Kigali. This knowledge trig-
gered Bagosora’s duty to prevent and/
or punish the acts of his subordinates. 
Furthermore, the Chamber made a geo-
graphical distinction between the crimes 
committed in Kigali and the crimes com-
mitted in Gisenyi, finding that Bagosora 
was not liable as a superior for the crimes 
in Gisenyi town but was liable as a supe-
rior for similar crimes in Kigali.
In its consideration of the specific 
murders against high-ranking offi-
cials, including Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana, the Appeals Chamber 
recounted the factors the Trial Chamber 
had identified in inferring Bagosora’s 
knowledge of the impending attacks against 
these victims. These included the timing of 
the attacks, which started within hours of 
the killing of President Habyarimana; the 
systematic nature of the attacks; the promi-
nence of the victims; and the fact that they 
occurred at the time when Bagosora was at 
the top of the military chain of command 
and had effective control over the Rwandan 
Armed Forces. Thus, the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that the Trial Chamber did not 
err in finding that Bagosora had the req-
uisite knowledge that these attacks were 
about to occur.
Having determined that Bagosora’s 
knowledge of his subordinate’s attacks 
triggered his duty to prevent or punish 
these crimes, the Appeals Chamber then 
examined whether Bagosora violated this 
duty. The Chamber stated that a superior 
meets the duty when the superior takes 
necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent and punish. Applying this rule 
to the facts, the Chamber concluded that 
Bagosora did not meet the duty to pre-
vent reasoning that “(i) Bagosora knew 
his subordinates were about to commit 
the crimes, (ii) that the military—over 
which Bagosora exercised effective con-
trol—had the resources to prevent the 
crimes, and (iii) that to the extent that 
it lacked resources, it was because they 
were deployed in executing the crimes.” 
The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial 
Judgment did not formulate a reasoned 
opinion on the issue of whether or not 
Bagosora fulfilled his duty to punish and 
instead arrived at the conclusion without 
analyzing whether a reasonable attempt 
to punish was undertaken. The Appeals 
Chamber thus completed its own analy-
sis and concluded that due to the short 
period of time during which Bagosora 
exercised effective control over the mili-
tary, in combination with evidence sug-
gesting that investigations into the crimes 
may have started during Bagosora’s con-
trol, a reasonable person could not con-
clude that Bagosora failed to take mea-
sures to punish culpable subordinates. 
The Appeals Chamber thus concluded 
that while the Trial Chamber had erred in 
its analysis of Bagosora’s failure to pun-
ish, the Trial Chamber had not erred in 
finding him guilty under the doctrine of 
superior responsibility as he had indeed 
failed to prevent his subordinates’ crimes 
(including genocide and rape) at Kigali 
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roadblocks. Nonetheless, the Appeals 
Chamber did not cite the error as a factor 
in the sentence reduction.
With respect to Nsengiyumva, the 
Appeals Chamber found that while he did 
not order attacks in Gisenyi town, as the 
Trial Chamber had ruled, he possessed 
sufficient knowledge of the attacks that 
his subordinates carried out in Gisenyi 
town (because he was stationed there) to 
be held accountable under the doctrine of 
superior responsibility.
The Appeals Chamber also addressed 
Bagosora’s arguments regarding his con-
viction for the sexual assault of the Prime 
Minister. Bagosora was convicted of the 
crime against humanity of “other inhu-
mane acts” due to the fact that a bottle 
was inserted into the Prime Minister’s 
vagina after her death. Bagosora argued 
that sexual assault can be perpetrated only 
against a living person because the prohi-
bition on sexual assault is meant to protect 
the sexual integrity of a person and there is 
no sexual integrity after death.
The Appeals Chamber did not answer 
the legal question posed in Bagosora’s 
argument regarding the applicability of 
sexual assault charges to atrocities com-
mitted after the victim’s death. Rather, the 
Appeals Chamber analyzed the language 
of the indictment and the Trial Judgment 
and considered whether or not Bagosora 
was convicted of conduct for which he 
was not charged, an argument the defen-
dant had not advanced, according to the 
Appeals Judgment. The Chamber stated 
that while the insertion of a bottle into 
the vagina of the Prime Minister after 
her death “constituted a profound assault 
on human dignity meriting unreserved 
condemnation under international law,” 
because the indictment of Bagosora read, 
“Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana 
was tracked down, arrested, sexually 
assaulted and killed by Rwandan Army 
personnel,” the indictment appeared 
to describe the events as if the Prime 
Minister had been sexually assaulted 
prior to her death. Thus, in the view of 
the Appeals Chamber, the indictment 
failed to give proper notice to Bagosora 
that he was charged with acts occurring 
after her death. Dissenting, Judge Pocar 
criticized the Chamber’s interpretation 
of Bagosora’s appeal for reversing the 
conviction on the basis of an issue not 
raised by Bagosora. Furthermore, Judge 
Pocar insisted that while the Chamber 
interpreted the indictment as implying a 
specific order of events, the indictment 
does not actually specify whether the 
sexual assault occurred before or after the 
murder. Through this reasoning, Judge 
Pocar concluded that Bagosora had proper 
notice of the charges against him and 
was not prejudiced by the wording of the 
indictment.
Finally, with respect to sentencing, the 
Appeal Chamber acknowledged that while 
it had reversed many of the instances 
in which Bagosora had been held indi-
vidually criminal liable for ordering cer-
tain attacks, it affirmed his responsibility 
for these acts as a superior. Noting that 
superior responsibility is considered no 
less grave than individual responsibility, 
it concluded that this alone would not 
result in a change in sentence. However, 
the Appeals Chamber cited the reversal 
of Bagosora’s conviction for the sexual 
assault on the Prime Minister as well as 
the reversal of his conviction for murder 
as a crime against humanity (based on 
the fact that this conviction was cumula-
tive with the extermination conviction) as 
reasons for the decrease in his sentence.
The Appeals Chamber also revisited 
the sentence of Nsengiyumva. As in the 
case of Bagosora, while the Appeals 
Chamber granted Nsengiyumva’s 
appeal on the issue of ordering, it found 
Nsengiyumva guilty of the same crimes 
under the doctrine of superior respon-
sibility, thus resulting in no change to 
his sentence on these grounds. However, 
it did lower his sentence based on the 
reversal of his conviction for murder as a 
crime against humanity in relation to the 
April 7, 1994, killings in Gisenyi town 
because the Chamber found it was based 
on the same acts as the conviction for 
extermination as a crime against human-
ity and was, therefore, cumulative.
Kelly Brouse, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary for 
the Human Rights Brief. Chanté Lasco, 
Jurisprudence Collections Coordinator at 
the War Crimes Research Office, edited 
this summary for the Human Rights Brief.
the Prosecutor v. IldéPhonse 
nIzeyImana, case no. 
Ictr-2000-55c-t
On June 19, 2012, Trial Chamber III 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda found Ildéphonse Nizeyimana 
guilty on three charges: genocide; exter-
mination and murder as crimes against 
humanity; and murder as a serious viola-
tion of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II. 
The Chamber found that beginning in 
April 1994, Nizeyimana participated in 
a series of joint criminal enterprises to 
kill Tutsis and that he also bore superior 
responsibility for all but one of the proven 
killings. Notably, however, the Chamber 
acquitted Nizeyimana of rape as a crime 
against humanity and a war crime.
As a Captain at the École des Sous-
Officiers (ESO), a military-training 
school in Butare, Nizeyimana served as 
the intelligence and operations officer. 
Although he was under the de jure com-
mand of Lieutenant-Colonel Tharcisse 
Muvunyi, the Chamber concluded that 
Nizeyimana exercised authority consis-
tent with an unofficial role as second 
in command at the ESO. Acting in this 
capacity, Nizeyimana was found to have 
planned and authorized the killings of 
thousands of Tutsi refugees at Cyahinda 
Parish. Nizeyimana was also found to 
have participated in the establishment of 
roadblocks intended to identify and kill 
Tutsis, including the direct order to kill 
Remy Rwekaza and Beata Uwambaye, 
as well as in the attacks in the Butare 
Prefecture that killed Queen Rosalie 
Gicanda, Professor Pierre Claver Karenzi, 
Prosecutor Jean-Baptiste Matabaro, Sub-
Prefect Zéphanie Nyirinkwaya, and 
members of the Ruhutinyanya family.
In considering the evidence of the 
killings, the Chamber distinguished the 
large-scale attack on Cyahinda Parish, 
in which thousands of civilians—pre-
dominantly Tutsis—were massacred, and 
found it to constitute extermination as 
a crime against humanity. However, the 
Chamber found the other instances that 
involved the killings of the individuals 
and families constituted the more nar-
row crime of murder. The Trial Chamber 
noted that while “there is no numerical 
threshold in establishing extermination, 
case law emphasises that the killings 
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must occur on a large or mass scale.” 
Ultimately, with respect to the individu-
als and families killed, the Chamber 
concluded that “the number of deaths in 
each instance [was] too ambiguous or too 
low to establish killing on a large scale,” 
and, thus, to amount to extermination. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Chamber 
cited the Bagosora and Nsengiyumva 
Appeal Judgment, in which the Appeals 
Chamber found that the large scale 
requirement could not be satisfied based 
on a collection of events “in different pre-
fectures, in different circumstances, by 
different perpetrators, and over a period 
of two months.” However, the Appeals 
Chamber in Bagosora and Nsengiyumva 
also found that a series of specific kill-
ings within Gisenyi Town that were per-
petrated in parallel with other killings 
throughout the town at the same time 
could be aggregated to establish the 
crime of extermination. Nevertheless, 
the Chamber arrived at its determination 
without resorting to a consideration of 
Nizeyimana’s murder convictions col-
lectively or an analysis of the geography 
and timing of the smaller-scale killings.
In addition to widespread killings 
of Tutsi civilians where the Chamber 
held Nizeyimana guilty, the Prosecutor 
was less successful with charges stem-
ming from instances of rape and other 
sexual violence crimes at the hands of 
ESO soldiers over which the Prosecutor 
claimed Nizeyimana exercised effec-
tive control. A major obstacle for the 
Prosecution in this case was the mixture 
of soldiers present at, and participating 
in atrocities: ESO soldiers—over which 
Nizeyimana exercised sufficient effective 
control in many instances—intermingled 
with Presidential Guard soldiers and gen-
darmerie, leading to confusion with regard 
to which soldiers committed which crimes 
and under whose command they were oper-
ating. Thus, the Trial Chamber was unable 
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
ESO soldiers involved in the killings and 
rapes at Butare University were at that time 
under Nizeyimana’s control as opposed to 
Presidential Guard superiors.
The insufficiency of evidence of 
Nizeyimana’s control also arose in the 
Chamber’s ruling regarding an attack 
on Butare University Hospital, where 
the Prosecutor alleged Nizeyimana bore 
superior responsibility for the rape and 
murders of Tutsis who sought treatment 
and refuge. The Chamber found that 
Presidential Guard soldiers began arriv-
ing at the hospital in mid-April and 
that these soldiers played a role in the 
violence against Tutsis at the hospital. 
Because of the presence of soldiers under 
two distinct chains of command, the 
Trial Chamber concluded that the civil-
ian witnesses were unlikely to have been 
able to distinguish between ESO and 
Presidential Guard soldiers, noting that, 
“[w]hile the first-hand evidence of rapes 
by soldiers . . . raises the reasonable pos-
sibility that ESO soldiers raped Tutsis at 
the Butare University Hospital, it is not 
the only reasonable conclusion.” Thus, 
the Trial Chamber found the evidence 
insufficient to hold that Nizeyimana pos-
sessed superior responsibility for the 
crimes committed at the hospital.
As a result of Nizeyimana’s convictions 
for genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes, he was sentenced to life 
in prison. Considerations that led the Trial 
Chamber to impose this sentence included 
the large number of deaths involved (espe-
cially at Cyahinda Parish), the abuse of his 
authority, and the gravity of his crimes. 
Because his convictions for these three 
categories of crimes were all based on the 
same acts, he was given a single sentence 
addressing all the counts rather than three 
consecutive sentences, as the Prosecution 
had requested.
Yakov Bragarnik, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, wrote this judgment 
summary for the Human Rights Brief. 
Chanté Lasco, Jurisprudence Collections 
Coordinator at the War Crimes Research 
Office, edited this summary for the 
Human Rights Brief.
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